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IHTBOPUCTIOK.
Since the outbreak of the World Way it has "been frequently
stated that the fabric of international law has been all but
destroyed; and the old barbarous methods of making 7/ar seem to
have been revived in the modern civilized world.
It is a fact that the history of the war during the past
three years is full of examples of violations of the most sacred
and fundamental provisions of the Laws of War, although no
belligerent has denied the existence of international law as a
body of rules binding upon them.
However, it is very interesting to note, wherever there
have been violations tne violating belligerent has sougnt to
justify its conduct on tne ground of military necessity or
because of alleged prior breacnes of law by its enemies. Military
necessity and retaliation are two totally different subjects
whicn, in my opinion, have to be kept strictly separate. I
have assayed the task only of investigating the former subject.
As t o trie latter, it does not concern the purpose of the present
discussion; and it will not tnerefore be considered in this
paper.
For convenience of study, it will be well first to
consider the question of self-preservation upon which the so-
called German doctrine of kr iegsra ison purports to rest, next
to discuss the fundamental orincioles underlying: the modern law
of belligerent operations and also the orinciple of military

necessity as understood by the civilised nations; in the third
place, we will consider the doctrine of kriegsraison which is out
forward by German writers and officially countenanced by the
German Government; then to investigate its application and
determine to what extent such necessity may concievably justify
severe measures. With this object in view and roughly corres-
ponding to the division just made, we nave divided our treatment
into the following chapters :-
I. necessity of Self-preservation.
II. Laws of War and Military Necessity.
III. German Doctrine of Necessity: Kriegsraison .
IV*. Application of Kr iegsraison in the present War.

CHAPTER I
NECESSITY OF SELiVPKESERVATIOIJ
jjt ^ 4 ^ -> > .f. ^. ^.

1.
CHAPTER I
NECESSITY 01 SELF-PRESERVATION
The most important of the fundamental rights of states
is tiiat of self-preservation. It is the first law of nations.
It underlies all positive rules and customs, arid takes prece-
dence of all other rights and duties. This is a principle
recognized and maintained by nearly all the authorities on
international law. Twiss, for example, states that "of the
primary or absolute rights of a nation the most essential, and
as it were, the cardinal right, upon which all others hinge,
is that of self-preservation. This right necessarily involves,
as subordinate rights, all other rights which are essential as
fll
means to secure this principal end." Henry YTheaton, says that
"of the absolute international rights of states, one of the
most essential and important, and that which lies at the founda-
tion of all the rest, is the right of self-preservation. It is
not only a right with respect to other states but a duty with
respect to its own members,, and the most solemn and important
which the state owes to them. This right necessarily involves
all other incidental rights which are essential as means to
(2)
give effect to the principal end." Carlos Calvo , a Latin
American writer, says "One of the essential rights inherent in
the sovereignty and the independence of states is that of self-
(1) The Law of nations in Time of Peace (1861) p. 144, Sec. 99
(2) Elements of Int. Law (l889f p. 88.

preservation. This right is the first of all absolute or per-
manent rights and is the fundamental basis of a great number of
(1)
accessory, secondary or occasional rights." Rivier, a noted
Swiss-Belgian scholar, says "these rights of self-preservation,
respect, independence and mutual trade, which can all be carried
back to a single right of self-preservation, are founded on the
very notion of the state as a person of the lav: of nations.
They form the general statute f loi ) of the law (droit) of nations
and common constitution of our political civilization. The
recognition of a state in the quality of a subject of the law
of nations implies ipso jure the recognition of its legitimate
possession 01 those rights. They are called tne essential or
fundamental, primordial, absolute, permanent rights, in opposi-
tion to those arising from exoress or tacit conventions, which
are sometimes described as hypothetical or conditional, relative,
fa)
accidental rights. John V/ostlake, one of the recent leading
English authorities, declares that "The writers on international
law often class the principle of self-preservation among their
fundamental, primitive, primary, or absolute rights. It is no
doubt a primitive instinct, and an absolute instinct so far as
it has not been tamed by reason and lav:, but one great function
fS)
of law is to tame it."
From these opinions of the leading writers of different
countries, it is quite clear that the right of self-preservation
fX) Le Droit Theori.que et pratique , 5th ed. Vol. I Sec. 208.
(2) xJrincipes du Droit de Sens (1896) Tlol. I p. 257
(3) L. Oppenheim - Collected papers of John Westlake (1914 )p. 112

3.
is primary, absolute, instinctive, permanent arid fundamental.
This right of state in the eyes of international lav; is to be
understood in the sense in whicn the rignt of an individual to
defend himself against an unlawful attack of the assailant
threatening the life of the unlawfully attacked. It is in this
sense tnat Hobbes emphasizes tne ' ius necssitat is ' ; "if a man
by the terror of present death be compelled to do a fact against
the law, he is totally excused; because no law can oblige a man
fl)
to abandon his own ^reservation. " Corresponding to the indi-
vidual right of self-defense the corporate person of every state
is vested with the inherent right of self-preservation. Thus
i3onfils says, "La conservation de soi-nieme est un 'devoir' nour
h)
les Stats." Rivier declared that "t he excuse of necessity
has always been allowed to nrivate oersons; a fortiori it will not
{?>)
be refused to states". Tt is for this reason that a state, in
order to protect and preserve its existence, may, in case of
extreme necessity, commit what would ordinarily be an infraction
of the law of nations and violate tie territorial sovereignty or
international right of another state. These infractions and
violations in self-preservation are not prohibited by tne law of
nations, tney are excused or justified in cases of necessity.
However tne excuse of necessity is by no means universally
accepted. To some publicists, it is theoretically unsound and
practically dangerous; to some others it is not permissible
because it is liable to abuse. Still other writers such as
Halleck and Oalvo, while admitting the right of self-preservation
fl) Coleman Phillipson - Int. Law & The 'Jreat V/ar (1915) p. 30
(2) Droit- Internationally public , sec. 242.
(3) °rincipes, Vol. I t>.278.

4.
by means of acts violating the sovereignty oi another state,
deny that it is a "pacific right". They regard any invasion of
a state's territory as "imperfect war". But in general, most
of the authorities on international lav: recognize that the
violations of other states in the interest of self-preservation
are excused in cases of urgen necessity. It -'ill be seend from
the foil owing opinions of the most prominent authorities that
the right of self-preservation takes precedence of all other
rights and duties. It is inalienable; and it can not be lost
or bargained away.
fl)
Hugo Grotius, who is universally recognized as the
Father of international law, says :
-
"Necessity, the protectress of human infirmity, breaks
through all human laws and all those made in trie spirit of
human regulations. In the prosecution of a just war, any
power has a right to take possession of neutral soil if there
be real grounds, not imaginary fears, for supposing the enemy
intends to make himself master of tne same, especially if the
enemy's occupying it would be attended with imminent and irre-
parable mischief to that same power. ,T
(2)
Sir Hobert Philliraore, a famous English jurist, has
the following to say on this subject:
-
"The right of self-preservation is the first law of
nations, as it is of individuals It may happen that the
same right may warrant her in extending orecaut ionary measures
without limit, and even in transgressing the borders of her
neighbor's territory. For international law considers the
right of self-preservation as prior and paramount to that of
territorial inviolability, and, where they conflict, justifies
the maintainanee of the former at the expense of the late right."
(3)
Another famous English jurist, Gravers xwiss, has the
similar expression on the use of neutral soil:
fl) Law of far & Peace Vol II oh. 2 Par. 10.
(2) Int. Law (1879) ch. 10 (GO XI)
(3) Law of nations - p. 149, Sec. 102.

5"When the safety of the state is at stake, the right
of self-preservation may warrant a nation in extending the
precautionary measures beyond the limits of its own dominions,
and even in trespassing with that oh.icct on a neighbor's
territory. 4.S the right of sel f-nreservati on is prior and
paramount to the right of dominion and property, in the case
of individuals, so the right of self-preservation is prior
and paramount to the right of territorial inviolability in
the case of nations, and if ever these rights conflict the
former is entitled to prevail within the limits of the
necessity of the case."
fl)
Edward William Hall, another English jurist, says:
"The right of self-preservation in some cases justifies
commissions of acts of violence against a friendly or neutral
state, wuen from its position and resources it is capable of
being made use of to dangerous efiects by an enemy, v;hen there
is a known intention on his part so to make use of it, and when,
if ne is not lorestalled, it is almost certain that he will
succeed, eitxier tnrough tne helplessness of the country or by
means of intrigues with a party in it."
(2)
Oppenheim, one of the leading English authorit ies . today
,
gives the following opinion on the violation of neutral territory
Tt is a fact that in certain cases violations committed
in self-preservation are not prohibited by the Lav/ of Nations.
It is frequently maintained that every violation is excused
os long as it was caused by the motive of self-preservation,
but it becomes more and more recognized that violations of
other states in the interest of self-preservation are excused
in cases of 'necessity' only. Such acts of violence in the
interest of self-preservation are exclusively excused as are
necessary in self-defense, because otherwise the acting state
would have to suffer or have to continue to suffer a violation
against itself. "
Now, let us examine the opinions of the American writers.
(3)
Francis //hart on, in his "digest of International Law", says:
"Intrusion on t ie territor:/ or territorial waters of a
foreign state is excusable when necessary for self-protection
in matters of vital importance, and when no ot her mode of
relief is attainable."
(4)
Seorge B. Lav is, another American writer, says:
fl) A treatis£-on Int. ii&w P. 273
(2) Int. Law - (190oT p. 178
(3) (2nd ed.j Vol. I Sec. 17,50 and 3Q
.
(4) Elements of Int. Law (1908) p. 93.

6.
wKiifij is called into being whenever the corporate exis-
tence of a state is menaced and corresponds to individual right
of self-defense. The danger may be internal, as in case of
insurrection or rebellion, or external, as in case of invasion,
either real or threatened, The right of self-preservation is
the first law of the nations, as it is of individuals. A
society which is not in condition to repeal agression from without
is wanting it its principal duty to its members of which it is
I composed, and to the chief end of its institution."
(1)
Hannis Taylor, in his work on international public law,
has the following expression:
"In the corporate person of every state is vested the in-
herent right of self-preservation which, when exercised in a
defensive form, embraces not only all those means through
which each independent political community guards its territory
from actual invasion, and the person and property of its
citizens, at home and abroad, from injustice and violence, but
also the permissible measures through which such a community
may take defensive action either within foreign territory or in
non-territorial waters when eft nor is unlawfully employed as a
starting point for attacks against it."
The excuse of necessity for self-preservation is recognized
not merely in England and United States but in otfter countries
(Z)
as well. Andres Bello, v/ho may be considered representative
of Latin American thought and practice, says:
"There is no doubt that every nation b&S tne ri ght of
self-preservation and is entitled to take arotective measures
|
against any danger what soever; out this danger must be great,
manifest and imminent, in order to make it lawful for ue to
exact by force that anotner nation alter its institutions for
our benefit."
(3)
Rivier gives the following opinion:
"When a conflict arises between the right of self-preserva-
tion of a state and the duty of that state to respect the right
of another, the right of self-preservation overrides the duty.
A man may be free to sacrifice himself. It is never nermitted
to a government to sacrifice the state of Which the destinies
are confided to it. The government is then authorized, and
even in certain circumstances bound, to violate the right of
fl) (1901) P. 405
(2) Princit)ios de Derecho de Jentes. Pt. I, Ch.I, VII.
(3) Princines du droit dcs gens - pp. 277-278.

7.
another country for the safety of its own. That is the excuse
of necessity, an application of the reason of state. It is a
legit irate excuse. "
The above quotations from the leading authorities show
convincingly that a state while in extreme necessity of self-
preservation is fully justified in committing any action which
would constitute a wrong and violation of international law
under normal conditions. in civil actions, for example, tne
plea of urgent necessity mignt be admissible as a defense.
Similarly it might in certain circumstances operate to excuse
particular acts otnerwise falling within the sphere of criminal
law. And such acts must have direct reference to the immediate
demands of self defense. That is, when there is no way of
escape from an assailant, acts of self-defense resulting in the
latter's death will fall within the class of justifiable homicide,
provided that no more force was used by the oerson attacked than
was necessar:/, that the attack could not reasonably have been
averted by anything lesc than the means adooted, and that the
nature of the count er-attack was not more serious than that
of tne attack. Apart from this extreme case of self-defense,
there can be no .justification for an act of homicide. Like
these justifiable exceptions in municipal law, there are inter-
national cases in which the violation of the rights of another
state may be excused, on tne grounds of self-preservation. But
for tnis it must be shown that injury of a very grave character
was threatened; that there was no other means of avoiding it;
and that nothing was done in excess of the requirements of self-
preservation. Under other conditions there can not be any justi-

8.
fication for an act of violence against a friendly or neutral
state. In spite of this understanding tae reason of things makes
it necessary for every state to judge for itself when it considers
that a case of necessity has arisen, and it is therefor impossible
to lay down any definite rule regarding the question when a state
may or may not have recourse to self-help which violates the
rights of another state. £*verytning depends entirely upon the
circumstances and conditions of the special case wnich occurs in
practice, and it is therefore of value to examine some historical
instances so far as they have involved the plea of necessity for
self -ores ervati on.

9.
fl)
OASE OF THE SEILQEE Oi1 THE DAMSH FLEET.
One of the most remarkable instances of the violation
of the rights of another state on the ground of self-preservation
was the seizure of the Danish fleet by England in 1807, At that
time the Danes were in possession oi a considerable fleet; they
had no army capable of sustaining an attack from the French forces
then massed in the north of Germany. After the treaty of Tilsit
the British government became cognizant of the existence of some
secret articles of this treaty that France should be at liberty
to seize the Danish fleet and to use it against rJreat Britain
which was then waging wat against France. If possession had been
taken, the Britirh position would have been greatly endangered.
On the other hand the French forces were within easy striking
distance; orders were in fact issued for the entry of the corns
of Bernadotte ana Davoust into Denmark before IJapoleon became
aware of the despatch, or even of the intended despatch, of an
English expedition. Under these circumstances tne British govern-
ment demanded tnat Denmark should deliver up her fleet to the
custody of Jreat Britain, and tnat, 'if the dema.id be acceded to,
every ship of tne navy of Denmark snail, at tne conclusion of
a general oeace, be restored to her in tne same condition and
state of equipment as when received under the protection oi the
British flag. 1 And at the same time the means of defense against
French invasion and a guarantee of her whole possessions were
offered to Denmark by England. Denmark, however, refused to
comnly with the British demand, whereupon the British government
eonsidering that a case of necessity of self-preservation had
fl) See Onoenhein, Vol.1 179, Testlake
,
701.1,315 and Hall, Sec. 36

10.
arisen, shelled Copenhagen, and seized the Danish fleet. This
exercise of the right of self-defense has been justified by the
best authorities of Great Britain but it has been frequently
condemned by continental writers.
fl]
CASE OF AMELIA I SLA NT)
.
Amelia Island, at the mouth of St. Story's River in
Florida, and st that time belonging to Sr>a in but very near to
the boundary of Georgia , was seized by a band of buccaneers,
under the direction of on adventurer named McGregor, who in the
name of the insurgent Spanish colonies of Buenos Ayres and
Venezuela preyed indiscriminately on the commerce of Spain and
the United State. In the language of Mr. Adams, secretary
of state of the United States, the buccaneers "assumed all atti-
tude too oernicious to trie peace a ^ the prosperity of this
union and of its citizens Id be tolerated." The Spanish au-
thorities made "a feeble and in effectual attempt to recover
possession of trie island", and the nuisance was one which
required immediate action. President Monroe called his cabinet
together in October 1817 and directed that a vessel of war should
proceed to the island and expel the marauders, destroying their
work and vessels. This expedition was followed by protests, not
merely from Onis, the Spanish minister at Washington, but from
Pazos, the agent of the as yet unrecognized Spani sh -Ame rican
colonies. However the United States maintained that necessity
justified an invasion of foreign territory so as to subdue an
exoected assailant, and on this ground may be sustained the
(1) See Oooenheim, Vol I, 180; -Vestlake, Vol . I, 334 and Wharton,
International Law digest, Vol. I, sec. 60a.

11.
expedition against Amelia Island, ana other similar cases such
as the seizure of St. Marks, Pensacola and otner Florida nosts.
fl)
OJLSE OF THE "CAROLINE"
Another important illustrative case is that of the
"Caroline". In 1838, during the Fenian raids in Canada, a
large body of Canadian insurgents and the United States sym-
pathizers nad assembled in the state of Hew York, where they
obtained small arms and twelve guns by force from an arsenal,
fired shots across the river liiagara into British territory,
and where preparations were made for a descent on Canada, by
means of a small steamer called the ''Caroline". This vessel
was emolojred by the mean st Black Hock and on Navy Island in
communicating with the mainland. On the 29th of December its
destruction took niece. According to the denosition of the
master, the ''Caroline'' left Buffalo on the 29th of December
for the port of Schlosser, which was also in Hew York. On the
way he caused a landing to b e ma de at Black Rock and the
American flag was run up. After the steamer left Black Rock
a volley of musketry was fired at her from the Canadian side,
but without injuring her, She then landed "a number of
passengers" at Havy Island, and arrived at Schlosser about
3:00 P.M. Subsequently, in the same afternoon, she made two
more trips to Havy Island, and returned finally to Schlosser
about 6:00 P.M. During the evening about 23 persons, all
fl) See Oppenheim, Vol. I, 180; ffestlake, Vol.1, 313; Wharton,
50c; Hall, sec. 84; J. B. Moore, Digest of International Law,
Vol. II, 24, 409; Vi , 261, and VII, "919.
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citizens of the United States, came on board and asked to be
permitted to "remain on board all night." At midnight about
70 or 80 armed men boarded the steamer and attacked the persons
on board with muskets, swords, and cutlasses. The "passengers
and crew" of whom there were in all 33, merely endeavored to
escape. After this attack the assailing force set the steamer
on fire, cut her loose, and sent her adrift over the lliagara
Falls. Only twenty-one of the oersons on board had since been
found, and one of these, Amos Durfee , was killed on the dock by
a musket ball. Several others were wounded. Twelve were missine:
After the "Caroline" was set adrift beacon lights were seen on
the Canadian side, and cheering was heard, and it was not doubted
fl)
that the assailants belonged to the sritish force at Chippewa.
On receiving information as to tnis violation of American
sovereignty the United states Government, called on the British
Government to show a necessity for self-defense, instant, over-
whelming; —leaving no choice Of means and no time for delibera-
tion;-- and also that nothing was done in excess of the require-
ments of self-defense. In the negotiations which ensued Great
Britain complained that a hostile expedition had been permitted
by the United States Government to organize on American terri-
tory without any effort being made to suppress it; and that
American citizens had supnorted the seditious movements directed
against trie safety of Canada. The United States Government,
on the other hand, complained that the attack on the "Caroline"
was not such as was warranted by the necessity of self-defense;

13.
that it was made upon a passenger ship at night; that it was an
invasion of United States territory; and that though the case had
he en brought to the notice of the British Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, unnecessary delay had taken place in the communication
of his decision in the matter. The negotiations lasted over five
years, hut the matter was in the end settled amicably. The Brit is
Government expressed its regret for vna t had occurred, and also
that an apology had not been made at the time. it the same time,
so far as related to the violation of tne United states territory,
it maintained that tnere was no choice of means, because there
was not time for application to tne American Government; it had
already shown itself to be powerless; ana a regiment of militia
was actually looking on at the moment without attempting to check
the measures of tne insurgents, Invasion was imminent; there
was therefore no time for deliberation. Finally nothing had been
done in excess of what the necessities of the occasion required,
for tne reason that the British forces had confined their action
to the cutting adrift of the vessel, and so depriving the
invaders of their means of access. The United States Government
ultimately accented these explanations, and the incident was
clos ed .
(1)
OA&E OF THE !*VlEGrIUIUS
"
The "Virginius" was a steamer which had been registered
in 1870 in the port of Hew York as an American vessel and had
received a certificate in the usual form; but for some time
(1) See Oppenheim, collected paoers of John V/estlake, p. lib,
rVoolsey, sec. 214, 2aylpr , sec. 406.

prior to July 1873 she had really been owned by and employed in
the service of the Cuban insurgent s. In July 1873, while so
employed, she left Kingston, in Jamaica, nominally for Limon Bay,
in Gosta P.ica, but really for the coast of Guba , and on being
chased by a Spanish warship put into Port-au-Prince , in Hayti..
Whence she proceeded again to the coast of Guba, but while still
on the high sea sue was again chased and eventually captured on
the 1st of November by the Spanish warship "Tornado". The vessel
was thereupon taken into Santiago de Guba , and tne passengers
and crew detained on a cnarge of piracy and aiding rebels, iour
of her passengers were tried, by court-martial on the 3rd of
November, and were shot on the 4th; later, sixteen .British subjects
oart of tne crew, were similarly tried and shot, in spite of the
protests of the British consul; whilst seven others were detained
in prison. Among those who were executed were nine citizens of
the United States. The United States asserted that the' Virginius 1
was as much exempt from interference on the high seas by another
power as though she had been lawfully registered.' As agreed
upon, the vessel was afterwards delivered to the United States
with the American flag flying; but owing to the production of
proof by Spain of her fraudulent registry, the salute to the
flag was dispensed with. Spain also oaid to the United States
an indemnity of $80,000. The British government also demanded
and obtained, compensation for the families of the executed, but
did not complain of the seizure of tne vessel, which was evidently
regarued as justifiable on trie grounds of necessity or self-
defense; but after the capture no pretension of an imminent
necessity of self-defense could be alleged, and it then became

15.
the duty of the Spanish authorities to orosecute the offenders
on a definite charge and according to lue legal forms, xhe
charge of oiracy was absurd.
x'rom the above study of trie works of the jurists of
different countries and from a review of the international cases
involving the plea of necessity we may well conclude that the
right of self-preservation is a recognized principle of inter-
national law. It takes precedence of all other rignts and duties,
But on the other hand, it is by no raeane unlimited. Then it is
exercised it is subject to certain limitations, iirst of all
the danger should be one of a very grave and immediate character;
in the second place, there should be no other means of avoiding:
it; and in the third place the acts done by way of self-preser-
vation should be limited to those which are barely necessary
for the purpose. It is under these conditions and within these
limits that the principle of self-preservation if recosnized in
international law as an excuse or a justification for certain
exceptional actions which would otherwise be unlawful; and only
to this extent it may be said to possess the character of a
legal rule or principle.
In spite of such a clear and definite esta ulisned
principle, the German writers sacn as Von iiiszt, Strupn, Schoen-
born, and ^uller, however, go much fatner tnan this with their
so-called doctrine of necessity, and aoply it, not only where
self-preservation is at stake, but in all cases of military
convenience and of extreme need when the object of war can not
be obtained otherwise. In other words the obligation to observe

16
.
tne laws of war is subject to the condition that it is consistent
(I)
with the attainment of the object of the war. With this
doctrine, Germany has justified her violation of Belgian neutrality
in 1914. V'e shall not discuss the case here, but will consider it
in a later chapter of this essay. For our nresent purpose, it
will be sufficient to say that the defense of necessity advanced
by German writers is quite different from that necessity related
to justifiable self-preservation in face of an unprovoked attack,
Therefore it is proper to have it treated in a separate place.
fl) Bordwell, Laws of War, PP. 5-6 and also DeVisscher,
Belgium's Case, a Juridical Enquiry, Translated by
S. F. Jourdain, PP. 27-28

CHAPTER II
LAWS OB WAB AND MILITARY NECESSITY.
^ *h K V
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CHAP EES II.
LAWS Of WAR AND MILITARY NECESSITY.
*t* f "1^ T T"
The laws of war are the rules of the law of nations
respecting armed contests between states. The roots of the
present laws of war are to be traced back to the practices of
belligerents which grew up gradually during tne latter pert of
the Kiddle Ages. The unsparing cruelty of the war practices
during the greater part of this period bes?an gradually to be
modified by the principles of humanity and of chivalry. Again,
I the nrinciple of military necessity whic h is really more or less
implied in the Principles .just mentioned requires that no more
|
force, no greater violence, should be used to carry out an
operation than is absolutely necessary in the particular circum-
stances. Jj'rom those principles, various laws of war came into
existence as natural corollaries of tnem. A decided progress was
made during tne eignteenth and again during tn e nineteenth
centuries, especially in tne time from the Crimean War to the
eve o a. the oresent world conflict. Within the last five or six
decades, numerous attempts have been made by means of national
instructions, and international conventions to arrive at a
definite understanding wit h reference to various rules of inter-
national law and more particularly those relating to the conduct
of war.
The first government to issue instructions to its
s was that of the United States during the Civil 7~ar of 1861

18.
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.
1865. Afterwards this example was slowly followed by many otner
countries such as Prussia, the Netherlands, France, naissia, Servia
(1)
The Argentine Republic, Spain and Jreat Britain. The instructions
of these various countries differ considerably from one another.
They are authoritative only for the armies of the nation by which
they are issued. Therefore it may be said that they are unila-
teral acts; they have no international effects although some
of them are substantial in accordance with the existing inter-
national law.
Those which have international effects are the existing
conventions and declarations that have bean enacted, ratified
or adhered to by the civilized governments of the world. They
are the Hague Conventions number III, IV, and V of 1907 and the
Regulations tnereto; Geneva Convent ions of 1864 ana 1906, Hasue
(2)
.Declarations of 1899 and bt. Petersburg Declaration of 1868.
These conventions did not pretend to provide a comolete code and
cases beyond tneir scooe therefore still remain the subject of
customary rules and usages preserved by military tradition and
in the wor^s of international jurists.
Now as to the binding force of the Laws of »ar, question
is often raised: Will they stand the test of a life and death
(1) for more detailed discussion, see T. E. Holland, Laws of
war on Land, t>p . 71-73.
(2) See Holland also, pn . 1-10, 74-82, 138-142, also British
Manual of Llilitary Law of 1914, n.234.

struggle of nations? Will not they be set aside and the
necessities of war excuse the acts whieh the laws of war condemn?
No, indeed, as soon as usages of warfare have by custom or treaty
evolved into laws of war, they are binding upon belligerents under
all circumstances and conditions exceot in case of reprisals as
retaliation against a belligerent for illegitimate acts of warfare
by the members of his armed force or his other subjects. The
authority of the customary law has derived from the unwritten
consent of nations, as evidenced by their practice, the force
of law-making treaties from the written consent given in the f orm
of signatures. They are inviolable and subject to no casuistry.
Military necessity oer raits no free action of military force and
can have no operative force as against the positive prohibition.
Most of the International Conventions, thus state the definite
intention of tne signatory powers:
According to tne viejs of the High Contracting Parties,
tnese provisions, the wording of which nas been inspired by
the desire to diminish tne evils 01 war, so far as military
necessity permit, are intended to serve as gen eral rules of
conduct for belligerent in their relations with each other
and with population.
It has not, however, been possible to agree forthwith
on provisions embracing all circumstances which occur in Practice;
on the other hand, it could not be intended by the High Contracting
Parties that the cases not provided for should, for want of a
written provision, be left to the arbitrary judgment of the
military commanders
.
( 1
)
tfrora this quotation it is obvious that the rules of
the Conventions rep resent the standard of conduct at which the
(1) Preamble of Hague Convention IV, Higgins, Hague Peace
Conferences, p. 209.

commanders are to aim. And it is with t :ie view of diininisning
the evils of war "so far as military necessities permit" that the
signatory powers have adopted the conventions on the laws and
customs of war. Thus the written laws of war derive their force
from tiie express consent given in the form of signatures to
the conventions. It is also plain that the signatory powers
have recognized that it is impossible to agree "on provisions
embracing all circumstances which occur in practice." Therefore
the commanders ore left as their own Judges in cases when obser-
vance of the Provisions becomes impossible. Although no legis-
lation can be made to specify beforehand the precise circum-
stances which would jus lily a commander in failing to act on
the rules laid down, bat no circumstances can justify the violation
of tne fundamental principles of tnese rules which prohibit the
infliction of needless force and violence upon persons as well
as property. The communuer could not ride off on the plea of
military necessity; for, as Professor Westlake has been careful
to point out, we have evidence in the preamble of the Hague'
Conventions on the subject that "military necessity has been
taken into account in framing the regulations, and has not been
(1)
left outside to control and limit their application."
How, let us discuss military necessity in somewhat
detail. By military necessity is meant measures that are necessary
for securing the end of war. It is "based upon a recognized
(1) westlake,. International Law, Pt. II, p. 57.
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principle that a belligerent . should be justified in applying
any amount and any kind of force which is necessary for the
realization of the purpose of war namely, the overpowering
of the onponent. But side by side there are other principles
of humanity and chivalry which saj/ that all such kinds and
degrees of violence as are not necessary for th e overpowering
the opponent should not be permitted to the belligerent. It is
due to the fact that these principles work together in deter-
mining the methods of warfare we find it difficult to say to
what limit violence is necessary and to what extent it is un-
necessary, it is a question of conditions and ci rcums tanc es
which occur in practice. It is an international question which
nas not been possible for the parties to the Hague Conventions
to solve. The question is an old one; and goes back to the
fourth century B.C. She Greeks, in their relations with each
other, recognized certain laws or "custom of Hellenes", such
as the inviolability of heralds, temple and envoys, tne right
of asylum, or sanctuary, and truce, for the burial of the dead.
In the Peloponnesean war the Athenians had garrisoned and
fortified the sanctuary of Apollo at Delium in Boeotia. The
Boetians refused to surrender the Athenian dead unless Delium
were evacutated. Then the Athenians entered the plea of
military necessity in reply to the charge of using: sacred water,
fl)
but claimed that they had not injured the sanctuary. A c ase
of this sort will not be worth while for oresent consideration.
What we are here interested in is the military necessity as
fl) A. S. Hershey, Essentials of International Law, pp»37-38.
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understood by modern civilized nations.
As just noted above, military necessity is a question
of conditions and circumstances which occur in practice, and
for that very reason it was not possible for the parties to the
Hague Conventions to solve it. In spite of the fact, it is
observaole that the del agates of the civilized states assembled
at the Hague and other conferences have distinctly agreed when
military necessity may apply and when it may not. The regulations
or conventions adopted have carefully discriminated between what
is prohibited, wnat is permissible and what is to be followed as
far as possible, fhis is convincingly shown in the express
reservations, as regards acts otherwise prohibited, which are
frequently made both by the Hague Regulations and otner conven-
tions, with the object of providing for cases of practical
necessity, j'or instance, the seizure or destruction of enemy's
fl) ' (2)
oronerty or cables between occupied and neutral territories,
(3)
the confiscation of nrivate nrooerty, the abandonment of sick
(4)
and wounded; the bombardments of undefended oorts, towns,
(5)
villages and dwellings, and many other needless sufferings
are all prohibited on the condition that the prohibition may
be waived in case of imperative necessity of war. Apart from
these ex or ess reservations, it may be well said that all other
fl) Hague Regulations, 23g
(2) Hague Convention IV, Article 54
(3) Hague Regulations, Article 46
(4) ^eneva Convention, Articles 1 and Id
(d) Hague Convention IX, Articles 2 and 6
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positive prohibitions, having by common agreement, are to be the
technical limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield
to the requirements of humanity and chivalry, Therefore military
necessity as understood by modern nations is by no means unlimited
For more definite and specific understanding of military
necessity than that implied in trie express reservations made by
international conventions it will be of great interest for us
to look into trie unwritten custom and tradition preserved in the
national instructions oi the modern civilized go vernment s.
The most important work of groat international value
is the ''Instructions for tne government of the Armies of the
United States in the Field" publisned on April 14, 1863,
during the American Civil War, They were prepared by Professor
Francis Lieber, an eminent jurist, and revised by a board of
officers of the United States army. They were made obligatory
upon the armies of the United states bv their publication in
fl)
the form of a general order of the war department.
These instructions represent the first endeavor to
codify the laws of war and they are even nowadays of great
value and importance. ''At t ie Brussels Conference of 1874,
the President, Baron Jomini, declared it was they that had
suggested the idea of an international war code and had thus
led the Russian EBnperor to convoke the Conference, and as the
Project of Declaration adopted at Brussels served as the basis
fl) For detail, see Davis, International Law (1903) pp. 499-601.
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of the Hague Regulations relating to the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, the historical importance of the instructions is
evident. In regard to military necessity we will find the
fl)
following provisions in section I of these instructions:
ARTICLE 14 Military necessity, as understood by
modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity, of those
measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the
war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages
o f wa r
.
ARTICLE 15 Military necessity admits of all direct
destruction of life or limb oi armed enemies, and of otner per-
sons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed
contests of tne war; it allows of the capturing of every armed
enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hostile government,
or of peculiar danger to the captor; it allows of "11 destruction
of property, ana obstruction of the ways and canals of traffic,
travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance
or means of life from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever
an enemy's country afford necessary for the subsistence and
safety of the army, and of such deception as does not involve tne
breaking of good faith either positively pledged, regarding
agreements entered into during the war, or supposed by the
;
modern law of war to exist. Men who take up arms against one
another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral
beings, responsible to one another, and to }od.
ARTiCIiE 16 Military necessity does not admit of
cruelty that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of
suffering or for revenge, nor of ma in in g or wounding except in
fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. It does not admit
the use of poison in any nan, nor of the wanton devastat ion of
a district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy;
and in general, military necessity does not include any act of
hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.
Although more than a generation has elapsed since these
instructions were prepared, the:/ are still in substantial accord-
ance with the existing rules of international law upon the subject
of which they treat, and form the basis of the Hague Regulations
relating to tne Law and Customs of war on Land. xhey are accepted
(lj Elements of International Law, apoendix A. pp. 503- i>04. Davis.
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"by text writers of authority as having standard snd permanent
value, and as expressing the usage and practice of nations in
war. Moreover, it is the fact that the most recent manual of
the United States Bales of Land Warfare issued by the United
States War Department on Anril 25, 1914 and reissued after the
declaration of war "between Germany and the United States in the
year of 1917 is not substantially different from that of
1863. In regard to military necessity, it says:
"The object of rar is to bring about the complete
submission of the enemy as soon as possible by means of regulated
violence.
Military necessity justifies a resort to all the
measures wnich are indispensable for securing this object and
which are not forbidden by the modern laws and customs of war."(l)
Although the wording of the sections quoted here is
different from that in the instructions of 1863, it has the same
meaning and the same spirit. If we comoare the sections 12 and
13 of t ae rules of 1917 with the articles 15 and 16 of the instruc-
tions of 1863, as to What does military necessity permit and what
does it not, we will find that they are exactly the same without
(2)
a slight difference.
Another manual worth while for consideration is that of
Great Britain. The British Government, which has long n referred
in such matters to 'trust to the p:o od sense of the British Officers
was at last induced to change it.s nolicy. In 1863 the »7ar Office,
(1) xvules of Land Varfare, Oh. I, Pections 10 and 11, may be found
in Complete [T.&. Infantry Guide, 1917, PP. 1715-1716
(2) Sections 12 and 13 of the Rules, 1917, also in the Complete
U.S. Infantry Guide, P. 1716; Articles 15 and 16 of Instruction
1863, quoted elsewhere in this paper.
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for the first time, issued the "Lianual of Military Law" in which
a chapter on the "custom of war" has inserted. It was compiled by
the late Lord Taring from the ordinary textbooks On the subject.
It was however stated to have "no official authority" and to express
"only the ooinion of the corn-oiler as drawn from the authorities
fl)
cited." It was not till 1904 that the Secretary of State for War
was induced to depart from this cautious attitude, and to entrust
to Professor Thomas iirskine Holland to prepare the "Handbook of the
Laws and Customs of "ar on Land". In this Handbook we will find
the following provision about the subject of military necessity:
"The object of war is to brine: about the complete sub-
mission of the enemy, as speedily as may be, and with the least
possible loss of life and damage td nrooerty.
Military necessity justifies a resort to all measures
which are indispensable for securing this object; provided that
they are not inconsistent wit h the modern lews and usages of warfare
These laws ana usages orohibit all needless cruelty, and
even needless destruction of human life.
They permit, on the other hand, that an invading army
may, on grounds of military necessity, devastate whole tracts
of country, burning dwellings, and clearing the district of
supplies. In this case it is, nowever, the duty of the invader (2)
to make tne best provision he can for the dispossessed population."
Many thousand copies of this Handbook were issued by tne
authority to the British army in tne same year. xhey were accepted
by the English jurists and publicists of authority, and served as
a groundwork for the new "manual of military Law" issued at the
beginning of tne present European War in 1914. In regard to
fl) I. E. Holland, The Laws of War on Land (1908) P. 73
(S) " " " - " " " " " PP. 12-14
also his Handbook of the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
(1904) pp. 3-4, section II, Articles 5, 6, and 7.
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military necessity this manual has a. still more strict provision;
it says :
-
' r In extreme cases an act may sometimes be justified on
the plea of necessity, if it is done by a oerson in order to
avoid inevitable and irreparable evil to himself or those whom
he is bound to orotect, though, of course, trie act must not be
disproportionate to the end to be attained, nor must more be done
than is absolutely necessary to attain that end. xhus if the
captain of a steamer, without any fault on this part, iinds himself
in such a position that he must eitner change his course or run down
a boat with twenty people in it, tie is justified in changing his
course, although by so doing he runs a risk of swamning a boat
fl)
with two oeople in it."
i'rom the above study of the manuals of trie Jnited States
and Great Britain it may be well said that milit arynecessit y is
again limited in the sense that it only justifies a resort to all
the measures which a re indispensable for securing the ends of the
war, and which are not 'forbidden by'' or 'inconsistent with' the
modern lews and customs of war. Moreover, it is in this limited
sense that the military necessity is understood and recognized by
other nations of the civilized world. The French "Manual de Droit
International a 1 1 usage des officiers de l'armee de terre', the
i
"Instructions for the Russian Army respecting the Laws and CustomsInof RTar on Land , the Spanish Oartilla de leyes y usos de la guerra''
and the manuels of a great many other countries confirm the same
view, maintain the same principle, and permit no free action to
fl) Manual of Military Law - 1914 - p. 88 - Sec. 12.
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their military force without restriction.
i
Nevertheless, the German manual At iegsbrauch im
Landkriege issued by the Great General Staff, in 1902, oroceeds
(!)
upon another theory, and it is diametrically opposed to that
which is held by all other nations. Indeed, German authorities
have f?ono the farthest in permitting the freest action to military
force when necessary to attain the ends in view. As to military
necessit:/, the Kr iesrsbrauch he s countenanced the so-called doctrine
J
of Kriegsraison. It is observable that there is no English word
which exactly expresses this conception. It is usually given a
term us "necessity of" war''. But, however, Professor Llorgan has
a different translation. He says, "kriegsraiso n I have translated
as the 'argument of war*. 'Necessity of war 1 is too free a
rendering, and when necessity is urged 'no t ig ' or ' notwendigke it '
(2)
~
is the term used in- the original.'' No matter which term is more
equivalent to the German word of kriegsraifon , but whet maxes havoc
of the Laws and Customs of -ar is the same doctrine. This doctrine
of kriegsraison, in effect, has a different function as compered
with the plea of necessity which we have just discussed at a great
length; and it is the military necessity, which the German Irnnerial
Chancellor told the world in 1914, "knows no law".. To do justice
to the German do-ctrine , I have though best to treat it in the
following two chanters. In the next chanter will be undertaken...
a discussion of the doctrine as maintained by German authorities.
fl) .eor critical discussion, see J. 5, Morgan, The German War Book,
chapter I, pp. 1-10.
(2) J. H. Morgan, The German «Var Book, p. 4 note.

CHAPTER III
GLKIvIAIJ DOCTRINE Qi1 NECESSITY : iCRIEGrSRAISON
.
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JHAPxKH III.
(JERiwAH DOCTRINE OP ZRIEGSRAISOU
Having considered the necessity of self-preservation in
international law and military necessity as understood by modern
nations, we come now to a new topic, namely, the german doctrine
of kriegsra ison . Before taking up the discussion of the ran in
subject we must bear in mind that this doctrine is not to be
confounded either with the necessity related to justifiable self-
preservation -r; s in the cases discussed in the first chapter of
this essay; or with military necessity in the sense in which
that is understood to sanction generally the destruction of
life and limb and prone rty, so far as the objects of war may
require, and in so far as Bay be lawful according to the laws
and usages of war; nor to be confused with those exnress reser-
vations as regards acts otherwise pronibited, which are frequently
made by the Hague regulations ana otx±er conventions, with the
object of providing for cases of practical necessity.
'Jhe doctrine of kriegsraison is put forward by a number
of Serman writers who refused to recognize the laws and customs
of war as imposed by any external authorities. By " kriegsrecht '
they understand " not a lex scriota introduced by international
agreements, but only a reciprocity of mutual agreement; a limitatioi
of arbitrary behavious, which custom and con vent ionalit 7/, human
friendliness and a calculating e fro ism have erected, but for the
observance of which there exists no exnress sanction but only
fl)
the fear of reprisals decides." As to the 'Kriegsrecht which
fl) J. H. Morgan, German War Book, P. 54.

30.
they do admit, they always apply a doctrine of Kriogsraison which I
purports to rest on the paramount principle of self-preservation
and on futility of requiring obedience to rules that would
become inconsistent therewith. According to Strupn, kriegsraison
"is founded on the supreme duty which is laid on the military
command to assure the fortunate issue of the war, the defeat of
tne enemy." In regard to the measures authorized by this
kriegsra ison
,
De visscher says that they "nave nothing in common
witn those imposed by self-defense. Ehey are simply the condi-
tions of success. Thus the plea is developed in quite a differ-
ent way. the tneorv of a state of necessity ( not stand J isolated
fl)
from notwehr is now to receive a suitable application."
All German writers conceive that the laws of war in general
lose their binding power in case of extreme necessity; they say,
"the entire law of war or Zriegsreclt is made up of two parts:
first, the Kriefrsr.anior
,
the custom or usage of war, which imposes
certain restrictions on the license of belligerent s ; and secondly,
the Kriegsra ison
,
the necessity of war which sets aside all such
restriction;- when their observance would be detrimental to the
military one rations and. renders more difficult the attainment of
(2)
the object for which the war was made." This distinction is an
old one , for prolessor Holland has carefully pointed out that Jlr.
Obrecht (1697), £ . If, Pastel (17o8) Kluber and even Rivier had
(3)
similar expressions in taeir respective works. As for instance,
fl) De visscner, Belgium's Jase, P. 38.
(2) Phillipson, International juaw and tne ireat War, p. 137
Similar translations may be found in Holland, Laws of War,
P. 13; V-estlake, Collected Papers, p. 143; and oppenheim,
International Law, Vol. II p. 79
(3) Holland, Laws of War, p. 13
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we may nuote from Kluber, he said: "Dans 1' exercise des ces
moyns de faire flu mal, leg nations civilisees des 1' Europe
observer! t generalement certaines regies quo ont pour but d ' empechejjr
qu'll ne se cornmette des cruates trop atroces et souvent me me
inutile s. L'emsemble de ces regies iorme la loi de guerre
( Ariegsmanie r , Ariegsgeb rauch) II ne peut etre deroge a cette loi
qu'en cas de retorsion, ou dans des circonstances extraordina ires ,
toujours par exc eption et seulement dans les cas orevus par la
coutume qu'on apoelle la raison de guerre. (ratio belli, Ariegs -
(1)
raison
)
. In his book: Lehrbuoh des ".Volke rrechts , xiivier uses
A.r iegsrecht in the sense of xCr iegsmanie r. but not exclude the
(2)
exceptional law. He says: " -vriegsraison geht vor iCr-iegsrecht
.
"
In his Princroes flu Droit des Gens, he states that "La necessite
de guerre oeut excuser des pigaeurs que leslois de la guerre—
: m
conflamnent . £11 e lorime les lois de la guerre. '' Lueder, Jllmann
,
Liszt and a great majority of other German writers on politics
and jurisprudence maintain the same view and emphasize the maxim
that Kri egsrra ison geht vor Ariegsmanier . Professor Lueder who
works out this doctrine of necessity in a most elaborate manner
affirms tnat to attain the object of war all regulative limita-
tions may be disregarded. His article in xlolltzendorff ' s Handbuch
Ama vnlk»r-paoht
.
which is usually regarded as tne classical
passage on the doctrine , will now have to be taken up for our
co nsiderat ion.
(1) Aluber, Droit des Gen Loderne de L'Kurope, p. 346-347.
(2) 'Vest lake, Jollected Paper, p. 244
(3) Kivier, Principes du Droit des Gene, Vol. II, p. 242.
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"Kriegsra ison embraces those cases in which, byway of
exception, the laws of war ought to be left without observance.
This can only happen in t^o cases, one that of extreme necessity,
when the object of war can only be attained by their non-observance
the other that of retorsion, as a retaliation for an unjustifiable
non-observance of the laws of war by the other side.
"The right not to observe trie laws of war exists in the
case of retorsion because, according to the known maxims, non-
fulfilment by one oart:/ nenrives that oarty of the ri^ht to claim
fulfilment by the other. At least this may be the case in war,
where, if the violations of the laws of war by the enemy were
passed without retaliation, a belligerent would be at a disadvan-
tage and worse off than his enemy who was guilty of the violations,
with reference to the "jnd which has to be striven for by all means,
namely breaking down the determination of the other side and
gaining the victory.
"As little can tne .jus ti fiableness of Zriegsraison be
denied on occasions of extreme necessity. If the necessity of
individuals is recognized as exempting them from punishment for
things never injurious done by than from tnat necessity, this must
be still more than in war, since so much more is at stake. V/hen
therefore the circumstances are such tnat the attainment if tne
object of tne war and escape from extreme danger would be hindered
by observing tne limitations imposed by tne laws of war, end can
only be accomplished by breaking through those limitations, the
latter is wnat ought to napoen. It ought to happen because it must
happen, tnat is, because oi no war will in such extreme cases be
hindered and allow itself to end in defeat, perhaps in ruin, in
order not to violate formal law. ilo prohibition can in such a
case effect anything, or present a claim to reco^mition and validity
and it would be idle to formulate one, for from what commander or
from what state could such a heroism of meekness and' renunciation
be expected?
"Of course such a conflict can only be of exceptional
occurrence, for tne laws of war are so framed by ordinary customs
and well weighed conventions that ordinarily it is possible to
follow them. They are built on those relations of fact which are
usually met with, just as are the rules of public national law
f Staat srecht ) and private law, and in one case as in the other
only specially exceptional conditions can make it impossible to
follow them. How should the laws of war, which have been laid
down in order to afford the protection of helnless civilians,
wounded and disabled soliders, orivate nrooerty, flag of truce
and the maintenance of conventions whiclj, nave been concluded for
the protection of an occupied territory against unnecessary
oppression, devastation and plunderi ng--how should such laws be
lightly unobservab le . That they should be so, that a conflict
should arise between what the laws of war prescribe and what the
necessity of war demands, is inconceivable except in quite extra-
ordinary cases of exception and tress. It is therefore entirely
out 01 question tnat kriegsra ison should be applied frequently,

lightly and at pleasure, and come to be considered as standing
it its practical use on the same line with the laws of war.
Much are we ratner dealing only with something quite exceptionally
happening, and for that reason the admission of kriegsraison
certainly appears, not to be too questionable. When however
the exception happens, it excludes the rules as its nature is to
do, and kr iegsrai s on takes precedence of the laws of war.
"The regular normal validity of the laws of war (krieg-
srecthJ is preserved by the introduction of kriegsraison
,
possible as it is only exceptionally. If this admissibleness of
kriegsraison in" extraordinary cases of necessity and exception,
an admissibleness whieh at any rate has to be fully and decisively
acknowledged, should lead one to think that there was at bottom
no binding law of war, by reason of its not having to be observed
in the critical cases of conflict with the demands of warfare, and
that instead of a law of war there was only a usage of war in the
sense condemned above (sec. 52), that would he to shoot far beyond
the mark, and to ignore the final and inner cause of every law
and legal institution. Kriegsraison is related to the law of war
as necessity to criminal lav, and it might be said with the same
right and supported by the same argument that there was no crimi-
nal law, because its rules have not to be observed in the cases
of necessity. The misapprehension above referred to vrould lead
to the one conclusion as well e s to the other. Thus by the full
recognition of a kriegsraison exceptionally justified the doctrine
which has been set forth above, that there really exists a law of
war and not merely a usage ox war to be observed at pleasure, is
not in the least altered; and as little can there be on that
account any question of right, assertea by J-rotius and i?ufendorff
but above confuted, to free one's self from the law of war by a
declaration to that effect. Even the ordinary rules of war can
not be denounced at pleasure, but only disregarded exceptionally
on a few well-defined grounds. If however, kriegsraison were
considered as something outside law (unrechtlich j and as a breach
of the law of war ( kriegsrecht ) , even then the non-existence
of a law of war could not follow, though such law would be liable
to possible violation. For from this point of view also the
state of things would be the same as in other denartments of
law, in all of which violations likewise occur, and indeed in some
cases violations which are unatoned for and can not be made sood."
fl)
From the classical passage quoted above, it is quite
obvious what is on the whole most significant is that the Serman
writers insist that Kriegsraison takes nrecedence of the laws of
war and support the same on merely two distinct grounds which we
fl) Holltzendorff , Handbuch des volkerrecht, Vol. IV, sections
65-66: translated by Yfestlake
,
Collected Papers, pp. 244-6.
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will discuss somewhat in detail in order to do .justice to their
do c t ri ne .
In t tie first place, the doctrine is defended on the ground
that "when the circumstances are such t nat the attainment of the
object of the war and the escape from extreme danger would be
hindered by observing the limit atio-ns imposed by tne laws of war,
and can only be accomplished by breaking through these limita-
tions, tne latter is what ought to nap pen. It ought to happen
because it must happen, that is, because the coarse of no war
will in such extreme case be hindered and allow itself to end in
defeat, perhaps in ruin, in order not to violate the formal lev:."
This ground, according to Professor lestlake, "reduces law from
a controlling to a registering- agency.'' In reality, it means
more; it creates an unconditional excuse of necessity which leads
to the absolute supremacy of strategical interest snd military
success. "It is the kriegsasai son, " as De visscher has carefully
pointed out, "that i? a raison d '"Ctat transposed into military
domain. The chief characteristic of the German conception is the
claim to superimnose on the legitimate and recognized exigencies
of war a notion of an absolute and unconditional character
'transcendental', ( ;,itfcelmann ) which controls the very laws of
war and gives autnority to abandon their most formal provisions.
This contention is a defiance of all juridical argume nt . It
takes its stand in an order oi ideas foreign to law, and thus
(2)
escapes its critism." But, however, we are aware of that all
the acts in war are founded on necessity and the necessity of
war has been taken into account in framing tne Laws of War.
gherefore it is inconceivable to say what must haooen ought to
(1) West lake, International Law, Vol . II, p. 115.
4^4—ftft"'vinioeh- iB r
,
1 Belgium' s Oaiag, & Juj iiUuiil liu i uli ' .i;
,
p. SO.
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happen. To use Phillipson's language, "the representatives of
the states assembled at the Hague Conferences have distinctly
agreed when military necessity may and when it may not apply, for
their regulations discriminate what is prohibited and whs t is
permissible and what is t o be followed as far as possible.
Military necessity can have no operative force as against positive
(1)
prohibitions." Then it aonears that the kriegsraison which
ta^es precedence of lav. in case of necessity is not a military
necessity as understood by modern nations but a means of obviating
tne consequences of the rales of war that stand in the way of
successful prosecution of war. In other words, it is a negation
of law.
In trie second place, kriegsraison is supoorted on the
ground that "if tne necessity of individuals is recognized as
exempting tnem from punishment for tilings never so injurious
done by them from that necessity, this must be still more the
case in war, since so mucn more is at stake. j£riegsra ison is
related to the laws of war as necessity to criminal law and it
may be said with the same right and supported by the same
argument that there was no criminal law because its rules have
not to be observed in case of necessity." This ground depends
chiefly on supposed analogies deduced from certain solutions
provided by criminal and civil laws. According to De visscner,
the German jurists, "expanding a conception contained in ererm
in section oA of tne penal code of the Empire, and confirmed
in what are, moreover, narrow limits by sections 228 and 904
of the -civil code, have tried to base a theory of not stand on
fl) Phillipson, The Jreat T7ar and International Law, P. 138.
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(1)
a new and purely objective argument." In our first chapter,
we have pointed out that in certain cases, there may veil be
exemptions from responsibility for acts or ommissions contrary
to law. In civil aotioxis, for example, the plea of urgent
necessity might be admissible as a defense. Similarly it might
in certain circumstances operate to excuse particular acts
otnerwise falling within tne sphere of criminal law* And such
acts must have direct reference to immediate demands of self-
defense. It is in this limited sense and in such a subjective
fofm that necessity is recopnized as a cause of exemption from
responsibility;- in notional law of all countries. And in inter-
national law, the exercise of the right of self-preservation is
also limited to the cases which are "instant, overwhelming,
leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation."
But the G-erman objective argument which is very disoutable in
national law can hove no onerative force in the law of nations.
If lifted into region of International Law, it strikes across
the fundamental principle of absolute independence and the
irreducible equality of sovereign states. Their declaration
that tne relation of kr iegsrai&on to <ir iegsmanie r is analogous
to t oat ol necessity to criminal law even for granted seems
scarcely valid, because, in tne first plao.i, circumstances may
arise in tne case of international relationships which can have
no precise parralel to those arising in relationship between
private citizens; secondly, tne essential guarantee "orovided
by 1he presence of a regulating authority in' the realm of criminal
and civil law is entirely wanting in the actual organization of
(1) -Ue visscher, Belgium's case, p. 41.
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international relations, therefore tnere is no place for
no tree ht. in international law. If applied, it "-ill appear to "be
a negation of lav: and will result in international anarchy.
"tfo one has formulated the condemnation of the theory in more
severe terms tnan the great German jurist, .Franz von Holtzendorif
in his classical work, Handbuch des Volkerrecht . ( iTol . II pp. 52-5' )
Here the conceotion of not recht is denounced by him as impracti-
cable in fact and subversive of all notions of order and of
(1)
justice in international relations."
The fore.?:oin£ examination of the grounds on which the
German jurists have supnorted their doctrine of kri egsra ison
proves that both their supposition end analogy are not only
unsound but entirely foreign to International Law. In snort,
their attempt of defense, as in the strong obiection raised by
(2)
Professor Westlake, is to border somewhat on legal casuistry,
But, however, the worst iE to come if we inquire about the prin-
ciples maintained oy them in tneir application to such methods
of war. According to German conception, kriegsraieo
n
is a
dominant and sovereign factor; everything may be sacrificed to its
demands. "An army can not be said to be acting efficiently
unless it constantly seeks to annihilate the enemy, to demolish
his material possessions, to crush his physical power, to destroy
his intellectual resources, to eradicate, above all, his moral
force; in a word, to bring about his entire demoralization.
To achieve t lis desirable object, every kind of intimidation,
every form of fright fulness
,
ever;/ manifestation of unmitigated
fury and violence are permissible, nay, indispensable
.
(1) Be visscher, Belgium 1 s Case, P. 49.
2) International Law f Vol. II, pp. 115-117
?J ?hiyjj^^<MIntQrn5;.tiori,-?1 T.kw and t Grflat -nr, p 1
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Thus v'on Moltke said, "The greatest kindness in war is to bring
it to a speedy conclusion. It should be allowable, with that
view, to employ all methods save those which are absolutely
objectionable. I can by no means nrofess agreement with Declara
tion of ?.t . Petersburg, when it asserts that the weakening of
military forces of the en 3my is the only lawful procedure in war
No! you must attack all the resources of the enemv's government,
(1)
its finance, its railways, its stores and even its p rist ige .
"
The same idea has been pet forth by Professor Lueder whose
classical passage on the doctrine of kr iegsraison we have just
referred to. Uow in its application, he says, "That ravage,
burning devastation, even on the large scale, as of whole
neighbonrlaoods .„.na tracts of country, m_y oe practised where
it is not a question of amy particular determinate result or
itategieal operation, but only of more general measures, as in
order to make the. further advance of the enemy impossible, or
even to show him what war is in earnest when he persists in
carrying it on without -'crious hope (frivol) and so compel
him to make peace this can not be denied in cses of real
necessity, as of a well-grounded kriegsr .ison. " (£) That all
these ideas form part ana parcel of the stoek-in-trade of
German officialdom is shown cle-rly oy the substance, and still
more by the spirit, of tae of iicio.1 nunu -1 3£jtiegsbrauch im
Landkriege issued and reissued by the German General - t-af
f
for the German officers of the ...rmies.
(|i) Letter to Bluntschii , Dee- 11,1880, cited Holland,
War on Lana, P. IE
(c) Holtzenaorf f ' s Hsndbuch des Velkerreeht, Vol. IV, sec. 114
p. 484, cited V.-estluke, collected Papers, P. ^46
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?his German W.9.T Book is supposed to be the outcome of the
rules established by the Hague Conference of 1899, but so far
the m^nu-.i is concerned, tae latter might never have exist-
ed. In its introduction, the War Book Bays, "kriegsraison
permits every belligerent sta.te to h-<ve recourse to ill means
which enable it to attain the object of war«" (1) fith this
premise in view, it goes on for the most part in ostentatious-
ly laying down unimpeachable rules but then quietly and immed-
iately destroying them by introducing exceptions as cases of
Itriegsraison . It is the Zri egs orcuch im Lane >ri ege which
gives the right of killing the orisoners of war from kriegs-
raison; (2) which permits bombardment of not ?nly fortresses
but also every oepn town and village without respect to the
civil population from kriegsraison; (5) which allows the com-
pulsion of the inhabitants to furnish information about their
own army, its strategy, its resources, and its military secrets
from kriegsraison; (4) which justifies the summoning of eivilia;
to supply vehicle,' and perform works of military character from
kriegsraison; (a) which sails for every sequestration, every
temporary or permanent deprivation, every use, ever;/ injury
and all destructions of private property from kriegsraison;
(6) which brushes away the limitations of international lew
( I ) J. II. ..lor^ n, "err: n r go ok, P. b2
l£) * " " " " P. 73-74
(3) M " " ?. 76 =>1
U) " * " " P. 117
(5) " P. 118
(6) " " " P. 124
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in regard to requisition from kri egsr-.ison; (i) nd which
viol .tes many other rules of civilized warfare und lav/ of
modern nations from kriegsraison ; .f2) In effect, :.s Phillip-
son tells us, "the German Majaual, by its ambiguous generalities
its subtle insinuations, its arbitrary reservations, its de-
liberate disavowals of widely accepted principles, says to the
warriors of German./: Soldiers of the P -therland .' your govern-
ment has, it is true, entered into treaties and conventions,
Bat these treaties and conventions „nd us ... ~;es are nought; they
do not bind you when you ma&c war. Your ousiness is not with
law; it is simply to crush the enemy by every mcuns in your
power, und as quickly and as effectively as possiule. lour
instructors say so the rest of the world does not matter."
f5) Then it may be well concluded that when the Germun oook of in
instructions to :^rmy officers expressly creaks down every safe-
guard for civilized warfare by .justifying exceptions to the
ru!Les governing sucn warfare, we can not fail to say thcit the
German government is r.iore barbarous than that of any other
country; for other countries which we have already noted in
our second chapter do not now recognize the ri ght of armies
to make such exoeotions.
(1) J. H. i.iorg...n, German V.ar Book, P. 154
(2) 1 ." ? " pp. 1-11
(3) Phillipson, International Law and the Great "ar, p. 137.
I
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Haw it may be profitable to sum up what we have said
about the doctrine and reach a conclusion. According to German
authorities, Xriegsrecht
,
the law of war, consists of two depart-
ments: 2Irie?smanie r
,
the ordinary rules of war; and Zriegsra ison
,
that which is permitted in Exceptional cases. In such case of
alleged exception, they emphasize the maxim that kr iegsraison gen
vor kr iegsmanie
r
,
that is to say, toe necessity in war over-rides
the rules of war. in its apnlicati on
,
Kriegsraieon gives to the
belligerent the right to decide not only when the necessity exist
but also trie things wnich are necessary ad finem belli
.
This
view finds also clear expression in tne x-Cri egsbrauc h im land-
kr iege of tne (Herman General Staff and the recent literatures of
a great majority of German writers. But, on tne contrary, it
must not be forgotten that it is not the purpose of law to enable
the strong to wreck nis will but to protect tne weak against the
strong. Jntil this purpose is realized international law can
not be law in full development and action but only an approxima-
tion to it. The doctrine of equality of states sets forth tne
ideal. Can it be said that International Law recognizes the
doctrine of kr iegsraison? No I not only do the customary rules
of war deny it but the declaration of Paris, the conventions of
the Hague Conferences and the other international agreements
bearing unon land and sea warfare proceed unon another theory.
Can it be said that the writers on International Law accept the
doctrine of kr iegsrai son ? No I it is not at all generally agreed
even among the German writers, as for instance, Blunt schli does
not mention it; and Koltt zendorff severely condemns it. Jnglish,
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American, i'rency and Italian writers do not acknowledge it.
The protest of Professor 'west lake against such a doctrine is,
fl)
therefore, the most justified; he says, "the question raised
under the term kr iegsraison is not whether that code is defectiv
or misconceived-, in any of its clauses, but whether a necessity,
not of war but of success, is to be allowed to break it down.
It is contended in effect, however innocent me. y be the inten-
tions of the authors, that the true instructions to be given
by a states to its generals aye: 'Succeed by war according
to its lav;, if you can but
,
at all events and in any way
succeed.' Of conduct suitable to such instructions it ma;/ be
expected that human nature will not fail to nroduce exanmles,
but trie business 01 doctrinal writ ers ' should be to cneck and
not to encourage it. Otherwise, the most elementary restraints
on war, which nave been handed down from antiquity, are not
(2)
safe .
"
(1) Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. II, p. 79.
(2) Westlake, International Law, Vol. II, p. 117.
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OHAPi'iSR IV.
APPLICATlbJS OF iCRIEGSBAlSOM IN i'HS PRESENT WAR.
In trie oreceding chapters we nave pointed out tnat the
Jerman writers and commanders have assigned to the plea of
military necessity a different and much more important function
through their classical doctrine and official instructions than
those of other countries. The question now is what are the
examples of such doctrine and instructions, wjhich hove been pro-
duced by the German soldiers since the outbreak of the World War.
In the course of the present discussion it is not a matter of
wonder to notice that the laws o f war should be overridden by the
doctrine of kriegsraison , but the wonder is that there is a
further movement in resnect to lirie ^sraison . namely, its extension
0V3r or apolication to a treaty to which Jermany was a party
and a long established law of neutrality. This is the case of
the 3elgian invasion of which Professor ±>e Lapradelle of the
University of Paris nas carefully stated tnat "no violation can be
imagined more concrete, more complete, more certain, more dis-
dainful of the institution, more offensive, not only to the
independence, but to the honor, of the neutral state than that
with which the guardians of this neutrality punished the refusal
to betray at her command the most express and well-defined
obligation. '
^
Before we take up the main question, it must be remembered
that war is a contest between belligerent states and any other
(1) Uorth American Review, Vol. 200, p. 851, Dec. 1914.
A.
44
Independent state has an inalienable right to remain neutral in
war, and the belligerent is bound to reepect this neutrality,
more particularly its territorial sovereignty, We knov that the
inviolability of neut ral t erri tory has long been the principle of
international lav: and reaffirmed in a convention of the Hasrue
Conference in 1907 and ratified by formal treaties of all
civilised governments. The pertinent narts of this great inter-
national code in regard to the sanctity of neutral territory are
as follows:
Convention V.
Article I. The territory of neutral powers is inviolable.
Article II. Belligerents are forbidden to move trooos
or convoys, either of munitions of war or supplies across the
territory of a neutral power.
Article X. The fact of a neutral power repelling, even by
force, attacks on its neutrality, can not be considered as a
hostile act.
Besides tne protection of this common law, Belgium was
placed in tne position of a neutralised state by tne Treatry of
1939, signed at London, by five great Powers: England, France,
Austria, Hussia, and Prussia. This treaty declares that Belgium
shall form "an independent and perpetual neutral state" and that
"she will be bound to observe this same neutralitv toward all
fl)
other states." The five great powers pledged themselves to
guarantee this status. Thus Belgium becomes trie ward of Europe
and the great Powers become her guardians. The question of the
binding force of the Belgian treaty was first raised dur in? the
fl) -"or texts, see Hertslet, Map of -^urope by Treaty, Vol. II,
pp. 858-871, 909-912, 979-99:3, 996-998.

Franco-German «^ar of 1870 when ^ngland, tearing that one or
botn belligerents might disregard it, demarjded assurance at
this point and succeeded in concluding ancillary treaties for
the duration of the franco -German »»ar and twelve montns there-
after, with France and Germany, by which these powers individual-
ly pledged themselves to respect the inviolability of Belgium
and this they both did.
On July 51, 1914 when war between Germany and France
seemed imminent
, the -^n^lish government
,
adopting the same
course of 1870, requested both German and French governments
for p psura ic e
/
to resnect the neutrality of Belgium so long
as no other power violated it. The French proverncent promptly
replied, sayin? that it was ''resolved to resnect the neutrality
of Belgium and it '".oilId only be in the event of some other
power violating that neutrality that France might find herself
undar the necessity in order to assure the defense of her
(1)
securit;/ to act otherwise." But from Germany tnere came no
reply. Therefore the -^nglisn government insisted upon it
again on August 1st. In spite of tne requests from England
the German government sent a note to Belgium on August 2nd,
in which it demanded a "benevolent neutrality" by granting a
free passage for German Troops through Belgium; in return,
the German government nromised to guarantee on the conclusion
of peace the ownership and independence of the kingdom to its
fullest extent." This was rightly and bravely refused by
f2)
the Belgian government on the next morning. On Au.^ist 4th
fl) See Garner, American Journal of International Law, Vol. IX,p. 7j
(2) Belgian Grey-Book, No.20ij nrinted in pamphlet of American
Ag-RS 1^ 10^ o1
' K "r-riti onv 1 ) one il ia t ion
,
January 1315, Ho. 86,
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the German troops marched into Belgium on the pretext of French
menaces. On trio same day, the English government still insisted
upon the same assurane that France had given. At once the reply
was given by Herr von Jagow, the Imperial secretary of state, that
"he was sorr7T to say that his answer must be no, as in consequence
of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning,
(1)
Belgium had already been violated " .
Undoubtedly, it was a violation of the treaty of 1839 as well
as tne law of neutrality. Germany did not deny it. frofessor
Garner of the University of Illinois nas carefully pointed out
that "the German government readily admitted tnat its act was a
violation of a treaty to wnich it was a party and a violation of
a Ions establisned orinciole of International Law, but justified
(2)
tne act as one of military necessity." inich an argument of
military or strategical interest was put forward in a perfect
clear manner by Herr von Jagow in his historic interview with
Sir E. Goschen, the British Ambassador, and the letter stated
the following;
"Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial
Government had been obliged to this step, n?mely, that they had
to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to
be able to set well ahead with their operations and endeavor to
strike some decisive blow as early ft 8 possible. It was a matter
of life and death for them, as if they had <?one by the more
southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity
of roads and the strength of th o fortresses to nave got through
without formidable opoostition aft-tailing great loss of time. This
fX) Dispatch of Sir E. Goschen to Sir Ed. Grey , Aupt. 8th, 1914,
cited Garner, American Journal of International Law, Vol.9,
o.75.
(2) English 7»"hito Book, No. 157, cited Garner, A.J.I.L. Vol. IX,
p. 77.
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loss of time would "neve meant time gained by the Russians for
bring up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of
action was trie great asset, while that of Russia was an inex-
haustible supply of troops, (l)
In his speech delivered in the xte ichstage on August 4,
1914, the Serraan Imperial chancellor, Kerr von Bethmann-Hollweg
made the following statement:
"7/e are in a state of legitimate defense. Necessity knows
no law* ^ur troops have occupied Luxemburg and nave perhaps
already penetrated into Belgium. Ibis is against the law of
nations. France, it is true, has declared to Brussels that it
is determined to resoect the neutrality of Belgium as long es
its adversary respects it, but we know thr t France was ready to
invade Belgium. France can afford to wait; we can not. A French
attack on our flank in the region of the lower Rhine might have
been fatal. It is for that reason taat we have been compelled
to ignore the just protests of the governments of Luxemburg
and Belgium. The injustice which we thus commit we will repair
as so on as our military object has been obtained. ''(2)
Here both the Imperial -Secretary and the Imperial
Chancellor gave no reference to any overt act by France violating
Belgian neutrality. Nor did the German correspondence with
Belgian and French governments bring forward any evidence to
substantiate the supposed l-'rench violation nrevious to German
attack.
In its ultima, turn to Belgium, August 2, the German govern-
ment stated that "reliable info rmat ion has been received by the
German government to the effect that French forces intend to
march on the line of the Lie use by (Jivet and iJamur." It was
therefore, "Germany's imperative duty to forestall the attack
(1) Communication of Sir $d. Soechen to Sir $d. Grey, cited
Garner, American Journal of International Law, Vol. IX n.77.
(2) Daily Telegraph War Book; how tne war began, p.-^Iil,
Another translation of the speech printed in a pamphlet of
American Association for International Conciliation, Nov. 1914,
Wo. 84.
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(1)
of the enemy." The ultimatum did not state the source or nature
of the information and the assertion is supported by no proof.
Even '"•hen the German minister aroused the Belgian foreign Office
in the dead of night during the neriod that the twelve hours of the
German ultimatum to Belgium were running-* because he had been in-
structed by his government to inform Belgian government that 'French
dirigible had thrown bombs, and that a French cavalry oatrol had
ft)
crossed the frontier in violation of international law,'' he
could not assert that those violations h^d occurred on Belgian
territory; but he confessed that it was in Germany. A few hours
later, Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador at Paris, in a
farewell audience handed a letter to M.Viviani, the Frencn Minister
of Foreign Affairs, which reads that T? the German administrative
and military authorities have remarked a certain number of defi-
nitely hostile acts committed on German territory by French
military airmen. Several of these latter nave manifestly violated
the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that
fft)
country." This accusation, if substantiated, would be a rea-
sonable justification for Germany to invade Belgium. But unfortun-
ately for Germany's defense on this ground, absolutely no evidence
worthy of trie nr:me hos been f orthco minor
.
Later the Germans m?de the charge that as early as July
25th Lie^e was full of French soldiers. Another charge was made
fl) Belgian Grey-Book No, 20 (July 24-Au^ust 29, 1914)
(2) " " ." No. 21 ( " " " " "
Both printed in Pamphlet of American Association for Inter-
national Conciliation, January, 191o, No. 86.
(3) -crencn Yellow Book, No. 147.
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tnat two wounded a renohmen had been found in Liamur who said their
regiment, the Forty-* ifth , was brought to Iiamur as early as July
30th. Again there was a further charge that there were quantities
of British artillery ammunition stored as early as the year of 1913
fl)
in Maubeuge, a French fort on the Belgian frontier. If these
charges had been in accord with fact, Sormany would have been
perfectly justified in disreerardi n<? the treaty of 1839 as well as
Belgium^ rights as a neutral state. Unfortunately to these charges
the Belgian Minister of Waj? replied that before iii-Tust 3rd, not a
(2)
single French or English soldier had set foot on Belgian territory.
Then all these charges seem scarcely valid unless they are sub-
stantiated by facts.
Iw'uch has been made of the alleged discovery after the
invasion of Belgium oi powers indicating tnat Belgium had ceased
to be neutral and was virtually in alliance with jj'ranceand Jreat
Britain for tne protection of Belgium against Germany. In his
remarks introductory to the secret papers, ^r. Dernburg stated:
"the Imperial Jhancellor has declared that there was irrefutable
proof that if Germany did not march tiirough Belgium her enemy
would. This or oof, as now being oroduced, is of the strongest
(3)
character." This Belgium, France and Sreat Britain have
officially denied and firmly stated that it is of a private end
(4)
unauthorised character.
fl) Berhhard Dernburg, Germany and the War, published by the
Fatherland, pp. 2, E4 , 55.
(2) London Times (Weekly edition) Oct. 8, 1914.
(3) The Case of Belgium, in the light of official reports found
in the archives of Belgian Government, with an introduction
by Dr. Dernburg and a comment of the IIorth-German Gazette.
(4) E. 0. Stowell/the Diplomacy of the T"ar of 1914, pp. 395-411.

50.
irora the above attempts at explanation, we find no reference
to any overt act by France violating Belgian neutrality and the
assertion made by Germany is not supported by any strong proof.
It may be well said that the BOX4 argument upon which the German
Government relies to justify its action in Belgium is the
necessity arising from certainty of French intention and miscalcu-
lation of the alleged events. At this point we must not forget
that the excuse of necessity can serve as a justification only
when there actually is a necessity as we have discussed at a
great length in the first two chapters of this essay. Indeed it
will not suffice that the one who disregards the ordinary rules
supposed such a necessity to exist .
In this present war there was really no necessity for
violating the neutrality of Belgium, since trance had just
recently given her solemn work tnat she would observe the Belgian
neutrality provided Germany followed a like course. It may be
conceivable tnat France might n£ ve prepared to invade Germany
through Belgium in case of a German violation of Belgian neutralit
but this France did not either. The best answer to all the claims
and allegations made by Germany is the fact that even after
Germany had entered Belgium's territor;/, it was several wee*s
before the French trooos could come up to render effective
(1)
assistance. Furthermore, there was an alternative plan to
follow. In a pr.mphlet "The Truth about Germany" edited by eleven
distinguished German writers with the assistance of thirty four
(1) Stowell, The Dinlomacy of the War of 1914, pn.418, 520.
a
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other public its, it stated that "the German nation is involved in
a war on two frontiers ^ gainst France and against Russia. This
Struggle can only he brought to a successful issue by overcoming
fl)
first one power with all our strength and then the other."
According to this statement
,
Germany would have another perfectly
feasible plan of campaign, that is to say, she might have confined
her offensive operation to the Eastern frontier and remained on the
defensive on the fleet, If she had followed this plan, the
Belgian question would not have arisen. Therefore the invasion
of Belgium was not necessary to the preservation of the German
nation. As to Germany's claim that Belgium was in alliance with
France and Great Britain, what has Germany been able to prove?
"Only that British military attaches had concerted with Belgian
military authorities plans of joint action against German invasion.
If, as is insisted, no consultations were held with German mili-
tary at t^cne"
s
to provide for the defense of Belgian neutrality
against a French or British invasion, what does that Torove? Only
that the Belgians knew "-ell or guessed rightly on which side
f2)
their neut ralit y was menaced." Even granting that such an
alliance were in existence, it is permissible in the eyes of law.
Rivier says, "the neutralized state should conclude defensive
alliances, not certainly such that would oblige it to defend its
ally, but alliences in whicn the ally would be bound to defend
the neutral state." This, however, Belgium did not. If she did,
the German chancellor would not hsve to admit Germany's guilt.
fl) Truth about Germany, facts about the war, pp. 52-53.
(2) Munroe Smith, Military Strategy and Diplomacy, in Policial
Science ^uaterly, Vol. XXJL p. 59 (1915).
(3) A. iiivier, Princioes Vol. II p. 60 (1896)
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"The wronsr , I speak openly, gentlemen, the wrong we have done to
fx)
Belgium will be righted when our military ends are accomplished .
"
To say that on August 3rd, 1914, Belgium had ceased to
be neutral and virtually in alliance with France and Great
Britain, or her neutrality had been violated by France previous
to the German attack is an assumption the proof of which is not
yet and never will be forthcoming. If they were so notorious
there would be no need of any doctrine of llr.iegsra iso
n
to .justify
the German invasion. The historic interview of the Imperial
Secretary of State with the British Ambassador and the straight-
forward declaration of the Imperial Chancellor to the Riechstag
have at least the merit of frankness. "Necessity knows no law"
appeared in those hours of warlike enthusiasm to be a sufficient
excuse for a crime which success would justify. The Reichstag
received tnese words with unanimous applause. The German people
thus considered itself satisfied. The German writers and jurists
had set to work; they have arranged an argument of not stand or
state of necessity to defend tn e action of their government.
Professor bonier says, "Germany did not threaten the essential
interests of Belgium, that the ultimatum drawn up in conformity
with the exigencies of not recht , offered to indemnify Belgium
for all the damages caused by German trooms and that when the
reckoning should be made, of the two alternatives mentioned,
the strategical interest of the Empire apoeared to be more
important than the interest which Belgium might consider implied
in the inviolability of her territory and in th^ respect for
(1) D. r . Johnson, Plain Words from America, p. 35.
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(1)
her neutrality." In another place, he says again that "Germany
Wight appeal to the right of necessity; this right authorized
her to invade Belgium; in regard to this necessity former treaties
(2)
had no longer any weight. 11 Dr. -^ernburg holds the same view;
he says, "treaties must be sacred, Germany has never been charged
with violating treaties. It was never proclaimed, except in the
(3)
Belgian case, tnat necessity justiiies the breaking of treaties."
Professor iiiemyer of the University of iCiel holds a similar
opinion. In one of his recent articles entitled "International
Law in War" he has gone to the length of saying that "one is
quite right in insisting for those treaties made for the event
of war tnat they are called into operation by a .state of war
arising, yet one dare not go further and attribute to them too
high a decree of validity; one dare not say they are more fire-
proof because they are especially m°de to endure the fire of
war. On the contrary, those agreements made for war stand in a
most dangerous dependence upon the crisis in international law,
which arises as every great war breaks out. They are immediately
and seriously threatened by that ruling mistress of war: 'kriegs-
raison' which sits in all such agreements hidden like a secret
wo rift that suudenly grows to Riant size ana swallow the whole
(4)
thing.
"
Such an excuse of necessity is entirely irrelegant , for
it is irreconc ilia ble with the very object and raison d ' etre of
(1) visscher, Belgium's Oase, pp. 45-46.
(£) " " " ' p. 53.
(3) Dernburg, Germany and the War, p. 21.
(4) Iliemyer, International Law in War, in Michigan Law Review,
Vol. XIII pp. 173-176.
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international law and international treaties. Germany's guilt
is universally recognized. It becomes more and more evident that
her srovernment has violated t he law and that it has miscalculated
events. Her plea of necessity to .justify the invasion of Belgium
may find favor before the House of pharisees, but can not be
considered before the Forum of International Law. It has been
condemned by all writers as well as by the uublic of the whole
civilized world. Bven in Austria and Germany t this dubious
justification has not commended itself to impartial minds with
the same force. A. Uutcn professor wrote to the iloelnisch
e
Zei tung
,
saying, "when Germany violated tne neutrality of Belgium
I was very indignant. But I was partially conciliated'.' by the
fi)
Chancellor's plea of necessity. Professor Lammasch of the
University of Vienna, has loudly protested against the violation
(2)
of treaties in the name of military necessity. furthermore,
it is of special interest to note that the German plea of
necessity in the case of Belgium is even contradictory to one
of tne few rules of war to which the military necessity or
kriegsraison of the German General Staff will admit no exception;
it says:-
"'J?he belligerent states have to respect the inviolability
of the neutral ancl the undisturbed exercise of its sovereignty
in its home affairs, and to abstain from any attach upon the same,
even if the necessity of war (or kriegsraison ; should make such
an attack desirable . ( 3
)
Besides the unjustifiable violation of Belgian neutrality
these are numerous lawless proceedings of the German armies in
(1) Naw York &un, Dec. 27, 1914, cited Stowell, the "Diplomacy
of the IVar of 1914, p. 446 note.
(2) De visscher, Belgium ' s .Case
,
p. ;54.
f 3 ) I lor gan , Germ an 7,'a r look, p*. 15 .
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Belgium and France and of the German naval forces at sea. As
we pointed out in the preceding chapter, the German J-overnrnent
has given instruction to its soldiers that kriegsra ison nermits
all means of destruction and violence, it is th on not a matter of
wonder to expect that tne German soldiers will not fail to produce
examples of conduct suitable to such instructions. in this ^reat
war, the breaches of law committed by the Jerman soldiers are verv
numerous in number. In addition to the violation of neutrality,
there are "the refusal to recognize certain legitimately enrolled
combatants, tne system of terrorism; the bombardment on land,
naval and aerial, of undefended placed; the indiscriminate
destruction and devastation of towns and villages; the deliberate
attacks on protected buildings, such as cathedrals and other
churches, museums, libraries, hospitals, private dwellings; the
unrestrained outra.q;ns on the civil population, including women
and children; the forcing of civilians to ?ive information, to
act as screens against the attacks of their own soldiers, and
to perform various prohibited services; the use of dum-dum
and explosive bullets, the use of asphyxiating gases, the poisoning
of wells, the hurling of blazing petrol; the disregard of the
white flag; the abuse of the Hed Uross; the illegitimate ruses
of war; tne lawless application of the arbitrary principle of 'war
treason'; the exorbitant requisitions and contributions, the
seizure of oriyate property, pillage; the arrest and ill-
treatment of hostages, the imposition of collective penalties,
the excessive severity and unprecedented arrogance of the
commanders and armies during the occupation of their adversaries'
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territory; the shooting of prisoners of war and wounded, the
attack of a hospital ship; the attack on merchantmen without
providing* for the security of thone on hoard, the destruction
of f ishiner-vessels ; t ; j.e indiscriminate laying of mines on the
high sea, the unwarranted extension of the maritime area of war,
implying illegal interference with neutral shiooina;, and other
fl)
contraventions of international law. 1?
Such unlawful acts as nave just been mentioned are not
isolated cases, but they are committed, repeatedly. What is the
excuse ofxeredby the violators for their barbarous conduct?
The German soldiers will undoubtedly say that if they are not
retaliatory measures they are certainly the measures authorized
by "military necessity" or kriegsraison . As we have seen it
before, in German mind, kriegsraison is tne p redomina t ing , the
exclusively sovereign factor; everything else must be unhesi-
tatingly sacrificed to its demands. In this great war, as
Professor Johnson of Columbia University says, "it was German
soldiers who murdered innocent hostages from 'military necessit:/"'
who destroyed much of Louvain from 'military necessitj;- ' , who
violated ever? 7" rule of civilized warfare and humanity in Belgium
from 'military necessity', who executed a noble -English nurse
from 'military necessity', who wrecked priceless monuments of
civilization in France from 'military necessity', who have
dropped bombs from the s\q/ in the darkness upon the sleeping
women ana children in unfortified places ana slaughtered hundreds
of innocent non-combatants from 'military necessity', who sent
fl) ^hillipson, International Law and the Great 'Jar, pp. 392-
393, for details see pp. 142-392.
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tobies at the "breast and their innocent mothers shrieking and
strangling to a watery .-rrave in mid-ocean from 'military
necessity 1 , and who have defended every barbarous act, every
crime against humanity on the specious and selfish plea that it
fl)
was justified by , 'military necessity'."
Indeed, such an ap-olication of the doctrine of military
necessity without restriction is directly contrary to the whole
trend of human civilization and is in conilict with the entire
structure of international lav;. We have noted in the ^receding
chapter that military necessity can have no ooerative force
as against positive prohibitions. But, on the contrary, the
measares of iegsraison are akin to the older barbarous methods
of making war which were thought to have been banished from the
world for ever. Thus it breaks down all the existing conven-
tions and long-established usages of war. It has shocked the
whole civilized wor Id and turned the tide of sentiment against
Germany more strongly than ever. To conclude, it may be well
said that kriegsraison may evade all the laws in existence, but
it can not ultimately arrest the Judgment which the ideals and
the sentiments of mankind dictates.
fl) D. V. Johnson, Plain Words from America, published by
Hodder and Stoughton, London, Lew York and Toronto, 1917
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concision
The doctrine of military necessity has now "been set forth in
its essential details. Its interpretation and application in
different countries have "been explained and we have their re-
spective contentions "both in the writings of their own authorities
and in the manuals of their own governments. The examples of
conduct suitable to such instruction have been brought to the
bur of the civilized norick
How, what the conclusion will be it is not difficult for us
to reach. .Ye , students of international law, are to do justice
for the world. Our ears are not too greatly deafened by the
roar of the cannon nor our eyes too blinded by the smoke of the
battle. We should be able to reach a clear and just conclusion
"without fear, favor, or af lection."
The nature of the conclusion is already apparent, but it
may be itemized as follows:
1. In general, the r>rinciple of self-preservation is
recognized in interna ti onal law as a justification for certain
exceptional actions which would otherwise be unlawful, but is
limited to the case of practical necessity for self-de fence
,
instant, overwhelming; leaving no choice of means and no time
for deliberation.
c, AS to the principle of military necessity, it is suf-
ficiently obvious that the international law of war is always
the result of a compromise between the "Principles of humanity
and necessity. Therefore it car; have no operative force us

against positive prohibitions. The Hague Conventions una the
Manuals of the United btates, Great Britain etc., aaopt this
correct view.
c. The German doctrine of Krie^ srais on proceeds upon
another theory; the necessity of war overrules the law of v.ar.
Although the doctrine is maintained "by German writers of author-
ity and officially countenanced by the German government; but
it is unanimously reprobated by English and ijnerican writers,
and not generally accepted by those of other countries even of
Germany.
4. The case of Belgium is neiiner a case of justifiable
Self-preservation nor cue oi military necessity. The application
of feyiegsraia on without restriction is entirely irrelevant, for
it is diametrically opposed to the very ob.iect and ralscri d'etre
of international law and treaties.
o. The unlawful acts of the German armies have shocked the
whole world and t< rneu the tide of sentiment against Germany more
strongly than ever. From its attempts to cov^r illegitimate ucts
by entering tne plea of military necessity in order to justify
its case at the bar of public opinion and gain the moral sympathy
of the world, it is seen what Jefferson callad a "decent respect
to the opinion oi mankind " ie still a mignty factor in human
affairs, and ma; we conclu.de this discussion in saying th»t
might is not ueeesfarilj right; and right is still the sovereignty
on earth.



